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ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PART I
Where is the proper balance between police power and
individual freedom?, This country is now undergoing
a needed, albeit agonizing, reappraisal of its administra-
tion of criminal justice. The following Comments and
those comprising Part II of the Symposium (which will
be published in the next issue of the REVIEW) are an out-
growth of papers prepared by the authors for a Seminar
on Administration of Criminal Justice offered by Profes-
sor Pugh during the past semester. In the subsequent
preparation of the Comments for publication, some were
supervised by Professor Bennett and some by Professor
Pugh.
SOME ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The United States Supreme Court is currently expanding the
rights of the individual who comes in contact with the law en-
forcement process. This development has intensified the conflict
between the two basic societal objectives of protecting the indi-
vidual's rights and providing an effective police power to main-
tain order. The purpose of this Comment is to investigate one
part of this conflict - the right of an indigent defendant to ap-
pointed counsel.
The existing rules in this area are recent ones on which little
gloss has been imposed. Confusion and uncertainty pervade the
area and few conclusions can be reached, for only the Supreme
Court can provide the definitive answers. In attempting to
clarify this uncertainty, this Comment considers the right to
counsel in Louisiana before Gideon v. Wainwright,1 the impact
of recent federal cases, possible extension of the right, the prob-
1See the excellent book, Police Power and Individual Freedom - The
Quest for Balance, edited by Claude R. Sowle (1962), reviewed in 24
LA. L. REV. 147 (1963).
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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lems raised by Escobedo v. Illinois2 and the nature of a proper
waiver of the right. It avoids historical background, to a great
extent, to concentrate on recent developments.
LOUISIANA LAW AND PRACTICE BEFORE GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT
The right to counsel was established early in Louisiana's his-
tory, the first Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans
enacting in 1804:
"That every person accused and indicted shall be admit-
ted to make his full defence by counsel learned in the law;
and the court before whom such person shall be tried, or
some judge thereof, shall immediately upon his request, as-
sign to such person such counsel as such person may desire,
to whom such accused shall have free access at all seasonable
hours."8
This statute, without significant expansion and with some re-
strictions, has remained the basic Louisiana law on right to
counsel, 4 although there are no indications that the provision for
appointment of counsel "as such person may desire" was fol-
lowed.5 It is possible that the early statute did not encompass
appointed counsel, but the courts recognized this right of indi-
gents as early as 1862.0
The current statutory provision, article 143 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure,7 provides for appointment of counsel in
felony cases if the defendant requests an attorney and makes
affidavit asserting inability to employ counsel. An oath made
before the court when counsel is requested is sufficient to meet
the affidavit requirement." In conformity to the statute, ap-
pointment was restricted to felony cases, including relative fel-
onies.9 Early jurisprudence interpreted the provision requiring
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. Acts of the First Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans, 1804,
1st Sess., c. L, § 35, p. 442, quoted in State v. Cummings, 5 La. Ann. 330, 331
(1850).
4. La. Acts 1855, No. 121, § 17; La. R.S. 1856, Criminal Proceedings § 18;
La. R.S. 1870, § 992. The relevant constitutional provision is LA. CONST. art. I,§9.
5. Subsequent statutes omitted this provision.
6. State v. Ferris, 16 La. Ann. 424 (1862).
7. LA. R.S. 15:143 (1950).
8. State v. Blankenship, 186 La. 238, 172 So. 4 (1937).
9. State v. Neely, 186 La. 171, 171 So. 840 (1937). Inclusion of relative
felonies is impelled by the definition of felony in article 2 of the Criminal Code
19661
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the accused to request appointment of counsel to mean a court
has no duty to inform an accused of his right to have counsel
appointed. 10 However, the courts attempted to establish a dif-
ferent rule at the turn of the century. In State v. Rollins,"
the court noted that the general practice was to inform an ac-
cused he is entitled to counsel although there was no duty to do
so, and reversed the conviction of a defendant who was not so
informed, considering this as one of many circumstances that
established the defendant had not been given full opportunity
to avail himself of the defense the state guarantees an indigent.
State v. Youchunas,12 in 1937, went further and held that the
court had a duty to determine whether an accused desired ap-
pointed counsel and a duty to appoint one if he then requested it.
Youchunas was partly overruled in 1950 by State v. Hilaire,"
which held that when the accused pleads guilty, the court has
no duty to inform him of his right to counsel and no duty to
appoint an attorney unless he requests one. The court distin-
guished Youchunas by pointing out that in that case the accused
protested his innocence, while the defendant pleaded guilty in the
instant case. To the extent that Youchunas established the duty
to inform an accused of his right to counsel, it was limited in
Hilaire to those situations in which the defendant pleaded not
guilty.' 4 In Hilaire, the court expressed a fear of opening prison
doors:
"For us to hold otherwise at this time, after the several
courts of this State have been accepting pleas of guilty on
arraignment without assigning counsel to the accused under
the practice and procedure long prevailing, would only serve
as an avenue for the release of a majority of the inmates of
the Louisiana Penitentiary who are now serving under pleas
of guilty."' 5
Article 143 does not state when counsel must be appointed.
However, the assistance of counsel must be effective, which re-
as a crime punishable by death or imprisonment at hard labor. LA. R.S. 14:2
(1950).
10. State v. Kelly, 25 La. Ann. 381 (1873); State v. DeSerrant, 33 La.
Ann. 979 (1881) ; State v. Perry, 48 La. Ann. 651, 19 So. 684 (1896).
11. 50 La. Ann. 925, 24 So. 664 (1898).
12. 187 La. 281, 174 So. 356 (1937).
13. 216 La. 972, 45 So. 2d 360 (1950).
14. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-
Criminal Procedure, 11 LA. L. REv. 233 (1951).
15. 216 La. 972, 978, 45 So. 2d 360, 362 (1950). The harsh requirements
were slightly diluted in State v. Lindsey, 241 La. 205, 128 So. 2d 11 (1961),
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quires that an attorney must be given adequate time to prepare
a case. 16 Since appointment at the beginning of trial does not
meet this rule, 17 counsel had to be appointed some time before
trial. The general practice had been to appoint counsel after a
defendant pleaded at arraignment.' 8 However, the advisability
of earlier appointment was cited as the better practice, especially
in capital cases.' 9
Therefore, prior to Gideon, Louisiana required appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases in time to
prepare for trial, when requested, and the court had no duty
to inform a defendant of this right if he pleaded guilty at ar-
raignment.
IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL CASES
The Federal Standard
Gideon v. Wainwright,20 applying the sixth amendment right
to counsel to the states, elevated the right of an indigent to ap-
pointed counsel in state trials to the constitutional level. Con-
sequently, it is now required that the court inform an accused
of this constitutional right, that it appoint counsel unless the
accused waives the right,21 and that the records of the proceed-
ing show that he was informed. The federal district courts sit-
ting in Louisiana recognized this change in Martin v. Warden
22
and Byrnes v. Walker.-'
The Supreme Court has also prescribed the time at which
the accused must be informed of his right and at which counsel
must be appointed. That time is the point at which the proceed-
ings reach the "critical stage" for the accused- when rights
are preserved or lost, or when damaging pleas or admissions
which held it was error to deny a request for counsel made at the opening of
trial even though the defendant stated he would employ counsel when, in open
court, he waived formal indictment.
16. State v. Ferris, 16 La. Ann. 424 (1862). See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 238 La. 595, 116 So. 2d 43 (1959) ; State v.
Ferris, 16 La. Ann. 424 (1862).
18. See Bennett, Right to Coun8el-A Due Process Requirement, 23 LA L.
REV. 662 (1963) ; Comments to Title XIV, Expos6 des Motifs, LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REvIsION (1962).
19. State v. Brodes, 156 La. 428, 100 So. 610 (1924).
20. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
22. 234 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. La. 1964).
23. 217 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. La. 1963).
1966] 669
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could be used against a defendant at trial.24 Louisiana's ar-
raignment proceedings 25 meet this test; therefore, a defendant
must be advised of his right before he pleads at arraignment.
If he does not waive his right, an attorney must be appointed
to assist him in pleading. In White v. Maryland,26 the right was
applied to a preliminary hearing at which a plea was made;
this was considered a critical time. Since Louisiana's prelimi-
nary hearing 27 involves no pleas or assertion of rights that can-
not be asserted later, the present rule would probably not require
appointment of counsel then. However, there may be situations
where counsel would have to be appointed much earlier under
the doctrine of Escobedo v. Illinois,2s which will be discussed
later.
Some problems may arise in this area as a result of Pointer
v. Texas,29 which held that the sixth amendment right of con-
frontation requires cross-examination through counsel. In Point-
er, a witness who had testified at a preliminary hearing at which
the defendant was not represented by counsel was unavailable
at the trial. The court held inadmissible the witness' testimony
given at the hearing because the defendant had no opportunity
to cross-examine through counsel. Testimony given at a Lou-
isiana preliminary hearing may be used at the trial, if a witness
is unavailable.3 0 Thus, if a defendant is unrepresented by coun-
sel at the hearing, the testimony obtained would be inadmissible
at the trial. Louisiana may be willing to forego the use of such
testimony instead of requiring appointment of counsel for pre-
liminary hearings. However, the possible extension of Pointer
blends into the implications of Escobedo in suggesting appoint-
ment be made prior to the preliminary examination or earlier.
Gideon applied the right to counsel in a felony case. While
the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that counsel must be
appointed for misdemeanors, there is language in Gideon which
24. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
25. LA. R.S. 15:254-260 (1950).
26. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
27. LA. R.S. 15:155 (1950).
28. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
29. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
30. LA. R.S. 15:155 (1950) : "The deposition of the accused, given voluntarily
as aforesaid, and of any witness, whenever it shall be shown that such witness
is dead, absent from the state, can not be found, or is too ill to testify, certified
by the committing magistrate and the official court stenographer, or the stenog-
rapher appointed and sworn for the purpose, shall be received in evidence upon
the trial of the case or in any subsequent judicial proceeding."
[Vol. XXVI
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implies that conclusion.3 1 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is
apparently of that viw.3 2 This problem is discussed later, but
it seems the Louisiana provision requiring appointment only in
felony cases may not fu'fill due process requisites.
8 3
The Guilty Plea
The rule of Gideon is retroactive.3 4  Thus, persons now im-
prisoned without having been given the full right to counsel will
be entitled to a new trial, or, in absence of that, release. In-
cluded in this category are those who pleaded guilty without
having been advised of their right to counsel, a guilty plea not
being a sufficient waiver of the right35 In Louisiana, the ma-
jority of criminal cases have been disposed of by guilty pleas,
many of these defendants probably not being advised of their
right to counsel since the law then did not require it and the
general practice seems to have been otherwise. Therefore, many
of the inmates of the Louisiana penitentiary who are serving
sentences under pleas of guilty,te and whom the Louisiana Su-
31. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) : "Not only these precedents, but also reason
and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." (Emphasis added.)
Ibid.: "The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.'
(Emphasis added.)
Ibid. "This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime
has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him." (Emphasis added.)
32. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Harvey. v. Mississippi,
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 19i5). These cases are discussed later in the text ac-
companying note 67 infra.
33. Remaining unchanged is the requirement that the accused must make
affidavit that he cannot employ counsel. Since the right to appointed counsel
depends on one's indigence, there should be no objection to determining that
status or requiring affirmance to inability to employ counsel. It does not inter-
fere with the substantive right to counsel, and it is not a practical difficulty
impeding the exercise of the right since an oath in open court suffices.
34. See, e.g., Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963) ; [nited States ex rel.
Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. den., 377 U.S. 998
(1964).
35. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945). See also Martin v. Warden, 234 F.
Supp. 495 (E.D. La. 1964), and Brynes v. Walker, 217 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. La.
1963).
36. For statistics reflecting the enormity of the problem Louisiana faces in
this regard see the RFPORT OF TIlE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF LOUISIANA Table xxvii (1964). For example, in Caddo Parish 1568 of 2440
criminal cases (70%) were disposed of by guilty pleas; Avoyelles, 235 of 341
cases (69%) ; Jefferson, 3877 of 4628 (84%) ; East Baton Rouge, 2720 of
5226 (52%). Of course, these statistics include misdemeanors which are not
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary and cases in which defendants
pleaded guilty with advice of counsel. Still, there remains a large body of prisoners
eligible for release.
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preme Court refused to release in State v. Hilaire,87 may now
apply for habeas corpus relief under the doctrine of Gideon 8
In habeas corpus proceedings, a petitioner seeking release on
the grounds of denial of the right to counsel will usually have
the burden of showing he was deprived of the assistance of
counsel and that he did not waive this right.8 9 However, there
is a presumption against waiver 40 which will make it difficult
to counter a petitioner's claim that he did not waive and was
not advised of the right, especially if there is a scant record of
the proceedings.
A more important problem relates to future procedures and
practices. Guilty pleas, if they are to meet constitutional stand-
ards, must be made with assistance of counsel or after a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the right. Rigorous standards
should be adopted to judge waivers made in connection with
guilty pleas and some means devised to ensure that such waivers
are intelligently made and are completely voluntary. 41 Consider-
ing the present requirements that an accused be informed of
his right to counsel before he pleads, and believing it self-evident
that fewer guilty pleas and more requests for counsel will be
made, it is submitted that the impact of the large number of
additional trials resulting will not be inconsequential. The state
will be expected to formulate some procedure for meeting the
additional demands.42
Proposed Code of Criminal Procedure Revision
The proposed revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
seeks to incorporate the constitutional standards explicitly es-
37. 216 La. 972, 45 So. 2d 360 (1950). See text accompanying note 13
supra.
38. Applicants for habeas corpus relief will be aided by the recent liberaliza-
tion of federal habeas corpus procedure. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962). For a detailed analysis of these cases
and the general liberalization in post-conviction remedies, refer to the companion
comment in this Symposium, 26 LA. L. Rav. 705 (1966). If Gideon is extended to
misdemeanors, there would be little additional retroactive impact since misde-
meanors are not punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary and most often
involve short sentences in parish jails or fines.
39. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
40. See, e.g., Byrd v. Sigler, 241 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Neb. 1965), which con-
tains an excellent discussion of the problem of waiving the right to counsel.
41. The problem of waiver of the right to counsel is discussed later in this
Comment in the text accompanying note 125 infra.
42. This subject is under consideration by the Criminal Law Section of the
Louisiana State Bar Association.
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tablished by the federal decisions without anticipating the strict-
er implementation of the right to counsel that some commenta-
tors predict will eventually be required and which the Fifth
Circuit seems to be adopting.48 It limits the rights to appointed
counsel to felonies. It establishes a time for appointment - be-
fore the accused pleads to the indictment. It, of course, requires
the courts to inform a defendant of his right to counsel before
he pleads. The requirement of an affidavit attesting to indigency
remains, also the provision that counsel appointed in capital
cases must have five years' experience.
44
The revision requires other higher standards in capital
cases.45 Counsel must be appointed when the accused appears at
arraignment without an attorney, irrespective of indigency. Ap-
pointment must be made at arraignment, although earlier
appointment is cited as a laudable practice. 46 The provision
for automatic appointment whether the accused desires counsel
or not could raise problems in the case of a defendant who does
not want an attorney, for he may have a constitutional right to
personally defend his own case. The Supreme Court has not so
ruled, but there are dicta to that effect. In Price v. Johnston,47
the court said that one has a "recognized privilege of conduct-
ing his own defense at the trial." The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has specifically ruled that it is error to deny a defend-
ant the right to conduct his own defense and to appoint unwanted
43. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Harvey v. Mississippi,
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). These cases are discussed later in the text accom-
panying note 67 infra.
44. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE CODE OF CRIMINAL PRocEnusa REVI-
,SION, EXPOSt DES MOTIFS art. 3, tit. xiv (1962) : "In other felony cases [non-
capital], when a defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, the court
shall inform him, before he pleads to the indictment, of his right to have the court
appoint counsel for him if he is financially unable to procure counsel. When a
defendant states under oath that he desires and is financially unable to procure
counsel, and the court finds the statement to be true, the court shall assign
counsel to the defendant before he pleads to the indictment. Counsel assigned by
the court shall serve without cost to the defendant." It should be noted that
title xiv was drafted before the decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, and that the
redactors of the revised Code intended to expand and clarify the right to counsel
without being required to do so by the recent decisions.
45. Id. art. 2: "When a defendant charged with a capital offense appears for
arraignment without counsel, the court shall assign counsel for his defense. Such
counsel may be assigned earlier, but must be assigned before the defendant pleads
to the indictment. Counsel assigned in a capital case must have had not less
than five consecutive years experience at the bar. An attorney with less experi-
ence may be assigned as assistant counsel. Cuounsei assigned bT, the court shall
serve without cost to the defendant."
46. Id. comments to art. 2.
47. 334 U.S. 266 (1948),
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counsel when the defendant is sui juris and mentally compe-
tent. 8 Other circuits are in accord.'") In the proposed comment,
the redactors point out that these cases are not capital cases,
and it is stressed that a defendant who rejects appointed counsel
is usually socially or mentally disoriented and must be protected
against his inadequate appreciation of the need for counsel. It
further advises that the status of unwanted counsel would be
at the discretion of the trial judge. This proposed mandatory
appointment would serve the laudable end of protecting the
rights of the mentally incompetent who might unjudiciously re-
ject counsel, although it would have to yield to the constitutional
right of .a mentally competent person to conduct his own defense
without an attorney. The proposed code also requires that the
minutes of the court show that a defendant was represented by
counsel or informed of his right to court-appointed counsel.50
POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF GIDEON TO ALL CASES
A vexing problem not solved by Gideon is whether the right
to appointed counsel extends to all criminal cases, or whether
there remains some category of offenses for which the right is
not guaranteed. Before Gideon, absolute applicability of the
right was based on a capital-noncapital distinction,"' with due
process also requiring appointment in noncapital felonies when
special circumstances existed.5 2 Gideon erased the distinction
and applied the right in a felony, breaking and entering with
intent to commit a misdemeanor, for which a five-year sentence
was imposed. Justice Clark spoke out against .the capital-non-
capital distinction and concurred on the grounds he could find
no acceptable rationalization for it. Justice Harlan indicated
that the "special circumstances" rule of Betts v. Brady5" should
be abandoned in those cases which carry "the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence" but added: "Whether the rule
should extend to all criminal cases need not now be decided.' 5 4
48. MacKenna v. Ellis, 23 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 360 U.S. 935
(1959).
49. Burnstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949); Mayes v.
United States, 177 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v. Gutterman, 147
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1945).
. 50. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE CODE 'OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVI-
SION, Expost DES MOTIFS art. 4, tit. XiV (1962).
'51. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45*(1932).
52. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).' "
53. Ibid.
54.372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).
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Until the Court does decide the question, the administra-
tors of the criminal law will be in an uncertain position with
few authoritative guidelines. The question is of immediate and
great concern; its solution seems to be bothering the Court itself,
the equivocal nature of the Gideon decision probably reflecting
a compromise of differing, uncertain views. Gideon and sub-
sequent decisions of the Court, however, can be the basis for
predicting what course the Court will take.
A necessary starting point in formulating such a prediction
is to define the rule of Gideon. Is the standard the "fundamental
fairness" concept of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, or is the more nearly absolute sixth amendment
right to counsel now obligatory on the states? If it is a due
process test, and due process may be considered that which "at
any given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasi-
ble in the light of then existing values and capabilities," 5 the
possibility of limiting Gideon to a point short of applying to all
crimes is better than if the sixth amendment applies with its
requirement that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." 56
Justice Black's majority opinion in Gideon accepts "Betts
v. Brady's assumption... that a provision of the Bill of Rights
which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made ob-
ligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment," 7 then
finds the right to counsel to be of this fundamental nature.
Due process language is used, as it must be, to apply the right-
to-counsel provision to the states. But once the right is estab-
lished, the language used is persuasive of the view that the right
is the same as the federal sixth amendment right. For example,
Justice Black's majority opinion speaks of the "right of one
charged with crime to counsel" as fundamental, and says that
"any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him."58  (Emphasis added.) Further, Justice Douglas in his
concurring opinion said, "My Brother Harlan is of the view
that a guarantee of the Bill of Rights that is made applicable
55. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. -1, 6
(1956).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.




to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment is a lesser
version of that same guarantee applied to the Federal govern-
ment." "But," he continues, "that view has not prevailed and
rights protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment are not watered-down versions
of what the Bill of Rights guarantees."- 9
More recent Supreme Court decisions have discussed the na-
ture of due process, and tend toward Douglas' view. Malloy v.
Hogan6 held the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation applicable to the states and said that the privilege is
governed by federal standards. In applying federal standards,
the majority of five, through Justice Brennan, thus referred to
Gideon: "We have held that the guarantees of the First Amend-
ment,... the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
of the Fourth Amendment, . . . the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, . . . are all to
be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment according to the same standards that protect those per-
sonal rights against federal encroachment.""' The following
term, Pointer v. Texas62 held that the sixth amendment right of
confrontation was obligatory on the states. Speaking for six
members of the Court, Black held this right to be enforceable
according to federal standards. Concurring, Goldberg agreed
with the theory of due process which imposes on the states the
federal standards of the Bill of Rights. Two Justices, Harlan
and Stewart, objected to this decision as another step in the
adoption of the incorporation doctrine.
While Gideon cannot be seen as explicitly applying federal
standards of the right to counsel to the states, the language used
in the case, the Court's interpretation of the case in Malloy, and
the holdings of Malloy and Pointer indicate strongly that the
Court will apply the federal sixth amendment test to the right
to counsel instead of a flexible due process test.
In making a case for the opposing view -that the Gideon
standard is less absolute than the federal standard - it may
be significant that, in Betts v. Brady,6' the Court referred to the
59. Id. at 346.
60. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
61. Id. at 10.
62. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
03. 316 U.s. 45f5 (1942).
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prevailing state practice of nonappointment of counsel in judg-
ing whether the right was fundamental, and that in Gideon,
the Court also noted the amicus brief of twenty-two states ar-
guing against Betts v. Brady. If, in the future, the Court looks
to the sentiments of the states and finds they consider appoint-
ing counsel too burdensome, it might be influenced in that di-
rection. It might also be persuaded by the congressional state-
ment in the area, the Criminal Justice Act,6 which draws the
line at petty offenses in providing payment to appointed counsel
in federal cases. A petty offense is a misdemeanor with a pen-
alty not exceeding six months' imprisonment or $500 fine or
both.ar5 It may be that the Malloy and Pointer cases are the limits
to which the doctrine of applying federal standards to the states
will be extended. It is also possible that the "federal standard"
and the sixth amendment requirements are not necessarily syn-
onymous, since the Court could require more of federal officials
under its supervisory powers. Even if the federal supervisory
standard required appointment in all cases, the sixth amend-
ment guarantee might be somewhat less rigorous, applying only
where it is reasonable or feasible for society to provide it. 6
However, it is submitted that the considerations favoring ap-
plication of the federal sixth amendment standard may predom-
inate, and that the state must be prepared to adapt its procedures
to this interpretation of Gideon.
POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF GIDEON - THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Louisiana is now directly affected by two recent Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decisions which, applying the federal
standard, enforced the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.
Harvey v. MississippiV7 extended the Gideon rule to the mis-
demeanor of possession of whisky, for which the maximum pen-
alty of a $500 fine and 90 days in jail was prescribed. In Har-
vey, the defendant was an illiterate Negro who pleaded guilty
informally to a justice of the peace, who apparently led the de-
fendant to believe his penalty would be a small fine. Following
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1965).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1948).
66. Proponents of these views will find little comfort, however, in the appoint-
ment of the court of Mr. Abe Fortas, the attorney who argued for the Gideon
decision and who wrote, before his appointment, that the right to counsel should
extend to all cases. Fortas, The Consequences of Gideon, 22 LEGAL AID BRIEF
CASE 7 (1964). See LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
67. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
1966]
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Harvey, McDonald v. Moore," applied the Gideon rule in a case
in which a fine of six months or $250 was imposed.6 9 In this
case, the extreme facts of Harvey were not present, so it seems
that Harvey will not be limited to its facts.
In both cases, the court quoted with approval from Evans v.
Rives,70 a court of appeal case applying the sixth amendment
right to counsel in a federal misdemeanor: "And so far as the
right to assistance of counsel is concerned, the Constitution
draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short period
and such loss for a long one." In Harvey, the court acknowl-
edged that the rule of Gideon had not been expressly extended
to misdemeanor charges in state tribunals, but it argued that
such a principle is implicit in Gideon. It pointed out that the
cases establishing the right to counsel were felonies, but said
their rationale did not depend on the felony-misdemeanor di-
chotomy. However, the court did speak of serious consequences:
"One accused of crime has the right to the assistance of counsel
• . . because of the serious consequences which may attend a
guilty plea." 71 This language could leave room for the view that
Gideon may not be extended to those cases where conviction does
not have serious consequences.
The more recent McDonald case, however, rejected a serious
consequences rule: The court believed that Harvey had rejected
this rule and that Gideon had repudiated any special circum-
stances such as was found in Betts v. Brady. It said: "We are
without any authority authorizing the announcement of a petty
offense rule." 72 Yet, the McDonald opinion seems to reflect grave
concern of the consequences of extending the right to all cases.
In any event, Gideon has been extended by the Fifth Circuit
to misdmeanors and beyond the Criminal Justice Act.73 It is
in this milieu that Louisiana must formulate its criminal law
enforcement practices. In the absence of Supreme Court deter-
mination of the question, it is submitted that the prudent Lou-
isiana judge will provide for appointment of counsel in the more
serious misdemeanor cases.
68. 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
69. The conviction was for possession of illegal alcohol, punishable by six
months in the county jail or $500 fine. FLA. STA2TS. § 562.45 (1951).
70. 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
71. 340 F.2d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1965).
72. 353 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1965).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1965).
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Rationale for Drawing a Line
If a line is to be drawn at some point short of extending
Gideon to all cases, the categorical felony-misdemeanor distinc-
tion seems inadequate. The classification remains in many
states more often by historical accident than by logical plan-
ning. Differences in classification of crimes exist among the
states, and some serious misdemeanors carry substantial sen-
tences and stigmatize an offender as much as or more than some
minor felonies. If one is convicted of several counts of a mis-
demeanor, the cumulative punishment can be very grave indeed.
It would be more appropriate to look to the potential penalty
for the crime and apply the right according to the severity of
the maximum possible sanction.
It may be strongly argued that practical considerations impel
the drawing of a line short of all cases. The courts are burdened
with oversized dockets now, and a general provision requiring
counsel in all cases would greatly increase the number of trials.
It would place a very heavy burden on the bar if such cases
were handled on a court-appointed basis. In recent years, there
has been increasing public awareness of the growing crime rate
and demand for stricter control of criminal activity which may
influence the court.14 Presumably, the public does not feel
strongly about the right to counsel for traffic offenses, crim-
inal trespass, and cruelty to animals. In balancing the rights of
an individual and society's interest in orderly law enforcement,
it may be difficult to justify extension of the right to counsel
in all cases. Such an extension would create problems that would
require basic changes in the techniques of law enforcement and
judicial administration.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court seems dissatisfied
with the state of criminal procedure and prison administration
in the United States.75 Its decisions are often met with hostility
by state courts and law enforcement officers. It is understand-
abel that the Court might question the views of police officers
who continue to use techniques that seem contrary to the stand-
74. See The Gallup Poll, Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 24, 1965, p.
14A, col. 5. Asked if treatment of suspected criminals was too harsh, 60%
responded they were not being treated harshly enough. Only 2% said they were
treated too harshly.
75. See, e.g., the dissent of White, Clark, and Harlan in Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and the dissent of White, Clark, and Stewart in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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ards it has established. 76 Also, the policy considerations dis-
cussed above which seem to compel the drawing of a line are of
less weight under the sixth amendment test than under a due
process test. Courts must look to interpretations of the sixth
amendment in federal cases as a starting point. Here, no line
has been drawn; the Supreme Court has not yet had the op-
portunity to decide whether the right to counsel extends to all
cases. Some language of the Court, however, suggests that it is
applicable to misdemeanors. In Bute v. Illinois, the Court said:
"The practice in the federal courts as to the right of the accused
to have the assistance of counsel is derived from the Sixth
Amendment which expressly requires that, in all criminal prose-
cutions in the courts of the United States, the accused shall have
the assistance of counsel for his defense. ' 77 Also, in Foster v.
Illinois: "By virtue of [the sixth amendment] .. ., counsel must
be furnished an indigent defendant prosecuted in a federal court
in every case, whatever the circumstances .... ",78 This language,
however, is dictum. In the 1942 case of Evans v. Rives, 79 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the rule
of Johnston v. Zerbst,80 the leading case recognizing the sixth
amendment right to court-appointed counsel, was applicable in
a misdemeanor case. Evans was quoted at length in Harvey
and McDonald to support the Fifth Circuit's application of the
Gideon rule to a misdemeanor. Further, Rule 44 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure s' seems to guarantee this right to
an accused misdemeanant.
One possible basis for drawing a line is derived from the fact
that another guarantee of the sixth amendment has not been
applied absolutely by the Supreme Court. The right to trial by
jury was held not to extend to petty offenses in District of Co-
lumbia v. Clawans, the Supreme Court noting: "At the time of
the adoption of the Constitution there were numerous offenses,
commonly described as 'petty,' which were tried summarily with-
76. For an excellent account of the problems and attitudes of a police officer
in a large city, see The Detective, Life Magazine, Vol. 59, No. 23, p. 90D (Dec. 3,
1965).
77. 333 U.S. 640, 666 (1948).
78. 332 U.S. 134, 136 (1947).
79. 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
80. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44: "If the defendant appears in court without counsel,
the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent
him at every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed without counsel
or is able to obtain counsel."
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out a jury."82 The offense in question, dealing in secondhand
property without a license, was found to be petty. The Court
pointed out, however, that it was not foreclosed from considering
severity of penalties in determining if an offense would be so
serious as to be comparable with common-law crimes, thus en-
titling the accused to the right of jury trial. Of course, the right
to trial by jury has not paralleled the development of the right
to counsel. Nevertheless, the existence of a doctrine limiting
another clause of the sixth amendment to exclude petty offenses
provides an analogy for restricting the right to counsel. Validity
of the analogy seems to depend on the nature of the right to
counsel at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and Bill
of Rights.
The historical sources and secondary works covering the
right to counsel during the colonial period are inconclusive and
unsatisfying. Although statutes were enacted to protect the right
to counsel, the practice under them and their intent are not
clear. During this period, the right in England was in a state
of flux. England allowed retained counsel in minor cases under
the apparent rationale that~the state's interest was so slight that
it could afford to be lenient to defendants. By statute, Parlia-
ment in 1695 decreed that those accused of treason had a right
to appointed counsel.8 4 Cases before the Star Chamber, usually
of a. political nature, required the presence of counsel. Yet, in
the great mass of felonies, the accused was not permitted even
retained counsel in the fullest sense until 1836,85 and there cer-
tainly was no requirement for appointment of counsel. The
practice, however, may have been more lenient.
Emerging from this background, the colonial tendency was
to enlarge the right to retained counsel and, in some cases, to
create a right to appointed counsel. However, the colonies were
neither clear nor consistent in their enforcement of the right.
In the debates concerning the Bill of Rights, there was little dis-
cussion of the right to counsel and no clear expression of con-
gressional intent.
Connecticut, as early as 1750, apparently provided for ap-
pointment of counsel if the accused requested it.86 Pennsylvania,
82. 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1936).
..83. See generally BLANEY, RIGHT TO.COUNSEL chs, 2, 3 (1955).
84. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (1695).
85. BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL 9 (1955).
86. Comment 73, YAiu LJ, 1000, 105* (1964),
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by statute, listed a large number of capital crimes for which
counsel had to be assigned to the accused; this has been inter-
preted to include most felonies, since most of them were pun-
ishable by death. 87 Delaware provided for appointment in capi-
tal cases ;81 South Carolina had a similar right.89 Virginia and
Rhode Island"" had statutory recognition of the right to be rep-
resented by retained counsel. In the remainder of the colonies,
a modified English procedure seems to have prevailed.91
From this experience, it is difficult to abstract a homogeneous
concept of the right to counsel. The few cases after adoption
of the sixth amendment shed little light. However, the general
trend of the times - expansion of the limited British right to
counsel - plus the fact that some colonies granted the right to
appointed counsel for what can loosely be termed felonies or
serious offenses and not in lesser cases, can be the basis for
concluding there was a division in the applicability of the right.
Some cases were excluded, but that class is not as homogeneous
or well defined as the "petty offenses" for which the trial by
jury was not granted. Even so, some crimes were excluded in
those colonies which provide for appointment of counsel. This
could furnish historical support for a court decision that an
amorphous group is still to be excluded from the right, the
boundaries of this group to be determined on considerations of
fairness, as with the right to trial by jury.
Considering the language in Bute and Foster and the hold-
ing in Evans, in addition to the unreasonableness of the felony-
misdemeanor distinction, the contention that all misdemeanors
will be excluded from the rule of Gideon seems unsound. Sup-
ported by the Court's interpretation of the right to trial by jury,
buttressed somewhat by historical sources, it seems that the con-
tention that petty offenses might be excluded merits serious
consideration. Petty offenses might be considered to include such
things as traffic violations and infractions of minor health regu-
lations, the line probably depending on the severity of the sanc-
tion.
87. Id. at 1056; BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL 16 '(1955).
88. Comment, 73 YAE L.J. 1000, 1057 (1964) ;. BANEY, RIGHT TO COXTNSB-16 (1955). .
89. See note 88 supra.
90. See note 88 supra.
91, B&ANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL 21:(1955).
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It is submitted that such an application of the Gideon rule
achieves a justifiable balancing of the interests in individual
rights and efficient administration of criminal laws. It amply
protects individual rights, including within its ambit felonies,
serious misdemeanors, and generally, those crimes considered
malum in se for which the penalties are the most severe and
with respect to which counsel would be most necessary to pre-
vent miscarriages of justice, plus some offenses considered
malum prohibitum for which the sanctions are serious. It ex-
cludes from the right those numerous minor offenses where its
application might seriously handicap law enforcement officers
and the criminal courts. In many of these minor cases, espe-
cially the traffic violations which flood the courts, affluent de-
fendants seldom employ attorneys. Such local court proceedings
are often less accusatorial and adversary and more inquisitorial
in nature, with the outcome resting in the discretion of a trial
judge. In such proceedings, justice is often done without activity
by counsel on either side, with the judge considering explana-
tions and extenuating circumstances and often suspending sen-
tence, and apparently society does not consider the lack of coun-
sel unfair.
WHEN TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Another serious problem is when in the investigatory-arrest-
trial proceedings counsel must be appointed. The Gideon deci-
sion was concerned primarily with extending the right beyond
capital cases, and does not touch directly the question of time of
appointment since the facts of the case involved denial of counsel
at the trial itself. However, there is little doubt that earlier ap-
pointment is required. Before Gideon, Hamilton v. Alabama,92
a capital case, required appointment before the defendant pleaded
at arraignment. White v. Maryland93 applied the right to a pre-
liminary hearing at which a plea was made. The rationale of
these decisions is that counsel is required at all critical stages
in criminal proceedings at which rights are preserved or lost.
With the distinction between capital and noncapital cases erased
by Gideon, the Court will undoubtedly use the critical-stage rule
of Hamilton and White in all cases in which Gideon applies.
However, this problem blends into the implications of Escobedo
v. Illinois,94 which poses even more serious questions regarding
92. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
93. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
94. 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
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the time at which counsel must be appointed, and which may
be the vehicle for extension of the right to an earlier time in
the criminal justice process.
Escobedo fuses several difficult areas of criminal law - right
to counsel, admissibility of confessions, the right against self-
incrimination and the nature of police detention. Aware of the
problems raised by the case, the Supreme Court has decided to
hear four cases dealing with interpretations of Escobedo, and
will presumably clarify the decision shortly. 5 In Escobedo, the
Court held that when a police investigation focused on the ac-
cused as a suspect rather than being a general investigation,
the refusal to comply with the accused's request to see his re-
tained counsel during questioning was a denial of the right to
assistance of counsel. Incriminating statements made to the
police during detention when Escobedo's counsel was not per-
mitted to be present were ruled inadmissible at the trial.
Although the holding of the case seems limited to the facts
presented, the Court used broad language in reaching its deci-
sion: "The 'guiding hand of counsel' was essential to advise peti-
tioner of his rights in this delicate situation. Powell v. Alabama
.... This was the 'stage when legal aid and advice' were most
critical to petitioner. Massiah v. United States . . . . It was a
stage surely as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton v.
Alabama,... and the preliminary hearing in White v. Maryland
.... What happened at this interrogation could certainly 'affect
the whole trial' . . . since rights may be irretrievably lost, if not
then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented
by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes." 96 Further-
more, the Court could have disposed of Escobedo on more tradi-
tional grounds, finding the incriminating statements 'involun-
tary' and in violation of due process because of coercion and
trickery. 7 This departure from traditional procedure and reli-
ance on the right to counsel seems indicative of an expansionist
trend. Further evidence is provided by the dissent of White,
95. For the cases to be reviewed, see 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3193 (U.S. Nov. 1965).
The cases are: No. 759, Miranda v. Arizona, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965) ; No. 760,
Vignera v. New York, 15 N.Y.2d 970 (1965) ; No. 761, Westover v. United States,
342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965) ; No. 762, Johnson v. New Jersey, 43 N.J. 572, 206
A.2d 737 (1965).
96. 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964).
97. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) ; Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503 (1963) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) ;Brown v. Mis-
sissippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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Clark and Stewart: "At the very least the court holds that once
the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any
admission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evi-
dence unless the accused has waived his right to counsel." 98
Left open are the problems of (1) whether Escobedo merely
recognizes the right of one to see retained counsel or whether
it establishes a new right that one must be given the right to
have assigned counsel during accusatory investigation. (2) If
the right extends to appointed counsel, must one request a law-
yer or must one be advised of the right and a lawyer appointed
unless the right is waived? (3) Does Escobedo establish a rule
to enforce the right to counsel during interrogation that would
make inadmissible the statements an accused made during the
time when the right to counsel was violated? or (4) does it en-
compass the fruit of the poisonous tree theory to the extent that
all leads and tangible evidence secured as a result of the ques-
tioning are inadmissible? (5) If the right to counsel is extended
to questioning, is this right retroactive? (6) Assuming the ex-
istence of the right, must the lawyer be present during all in-
terrogation, or is it possible that he need merely consult with
the accused before questioning, the police being allowed to ques-
tion freely after the consultation? These questions are before
the Court now.
Existence of the Right
The first step in an expansion process is the recognition of a
constitutional right of an indigent to appointed counsel during
accusatory investigation, rather than limiting Escobedo to a
right to see one's retained counsel. It has been suggested that
the reasoning and effect of Gideon indicate that there may be a
right to appointed counsel whenever the right to retained coun-
sel exists.9 9 Gideon erased the distinction in felony prosecutions;
Hamilton and White carry the right to the critical stage of the
proceedings. In any event, the distinction between the two areas
of retained and appointed counsel has been lessened, and the
trend has been to extend to an indigent the right to appointed
counsel formerly restricted to retained counsel. If questioning
during detention is a critical stage at which actions are taken
that would affect the whole trial, then, under the tests of Ham-
ilton and White, counsel should be appointed at that stage. If the
98. 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964).
99. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1007 (1964).
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right is applied, there arises the difficult question of defining
the point at which an investigation ceases to be general and be-
comes accusatory, the point at which the right is activated. Pre-
sumably, arrest would generally meet the test, for it involves an
accusation of crime. Under the terms of the "investigatory-
accusatory" test, it is plausible that the right might arise before
arrest in some cases, as when the police questioning is no longer
for general elicitation of information about a crime but is to
elicit incriminating statements or confessions from the person
believed to be guilty.
Informing a Suspect of the Right
If the right to counsel at the accusatory stage is recognized
as a due process right, it would seem that counsel must be ap-
pointed unless the suspect waives the right. To waive, one must
know of the existence of the right, so it would be required that
the defendant be informed of this right as soon as he is defi-
nitely accused of the crime. If the accusatory stage is a critical
one, failure to advise the defendant of his right to counsel can be
as prejudicial as failure to inform him of this right at arraign-
ment or trial. Presumably it would be the duty of the booking
officer, in the case of an arrest, or the questioner, in the case
of a pre-arrest "accusatory investigation," to inform a suspect
of this right to counsel, and it would be before those officers that
the right could be waived. This would require some procedure
for assuring a suspect of his right to counsel before further ques-
tioning. Difficulties of proving that a waiver was completely
voluntary might arise, and the advisability of depending on the
police officers for carrying out the right might be questioned
by some courts. In light of these problems there may arise subtle
pressure on the states to adopt or enforce provisions that an
accused be taken to a committing magistrate without unneces-
sary delay after arrest, as in the federal procedure,10 and to
have the committing magistrate advise the suspect of his rights.
It may be that the right to counsel would not have to be enforced
at this stage if the police do not intend to quesion a suspect after
arrest. Statements made during questioning when the right to
100. The federal Mc-Yabb-Mallory rule makes inadmissible in court all state-
ments by a person detained in violation of the provision that the accused must
be taken before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. See Mallor?




council is violated would not be admissible at trial. If there is
to be no questioning, it would seem that counsel would not be
required. It may also be that the police might choose to question
even though counsel is not present, where they know the results
of the questioning would not be used at trial. But, if they do so,
the courts could conceivably apply the fruit of the poison tree
doctrine to exclude whatever evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the questioning.
Enforcement of the Right
If the right is recognized, the problem of its enforcement
arises. In Wolf v. Colorado,1 1 the Court held that a right against
illegal search and seizure applied to the states, but it tempered
this by holding that enforcement of the rule did not require ex-
clusion of the evidence so obtained. Wolf was reversed by Mapp
v. Ohio,'02 holding that a rule of exclusion was required to en-
force the right effectively. From this experience, it seems the
Court would apply an exclusionary rule in the right to counsel
area, also. The Escobedo decision did that -it excluded the
incriminating statements made during detention. Thus, assum-
ing the Court applies the right, an exclusionary rule is inevitable.
This result would be similar to the exclusionary McNabb-Mallory
rule applied in federal courts.10 3 Practically, it is obvious that
an exclusionary rule is necessary to enforce the right, for sepa-
rate civil prosecutions for damages or criminal prosecutions for
violating the right are ineffective, as shown by the experience
with Wolf.
The Poisonous Tree Doctrine
There is also a possibility of extension beyond the exclusion
of the statements themselves. It could be established that leads
and other tangible evidence obtained during questioning without
counsel would be inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
This poison fruit doctrine, in the search and seizure area, pro-
vides not only that the evidence obtained by an illegal search
or seizure is inadmissible, but that any additional evidence se-
cured as a result of the illegal activity is also tainted with the
illegality and is inadmissible. This doctrine, originating with
101. 38 U.S. 25 (1949).
102. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
103. See note 100 supra.
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Silverthorne v. United States,1 04 seems to be applicable to the
states. 0 5
The doctrine can be analogized to the right to counsel, if the
right is held to extend to accusatory questioning. Here again,
the purpose of the exclusionary rule would be to enforce the
original right. It can be argued that effective enforcement of
the right also requires more than mere exclusion of the incrimi-
nating statements themselves and requires exclusion of the
fruits. Otherwise, the police still might have reason for con-
ducting illegal questioning in order to obtain leads to tangible
evidence.
However, the poison fruit doctrine has not been applied in
the confession area.10 Under the prevailing doctrine, confes-
sions involuntarily obtained are inadmissible, but there is no
limitation on using them to obtain other evidence. The potential
right to counsel in this area is more closely related to the con-
fession cases than the search and seizure cases. Also, under
the federal McNabb-Mallory rule, the poison fruit doctrine has
not been applied. There has been some discontent, however, with
the lack of a poison fruit doctrine under McNabb-Mallory and
there is some commentary urging that such a rule is needed.',"
If additional evidence obtained as a result of leads obtained
from a confession can be used at trial, almost as much damage
is done to the accused as if the information came from him, and
this damage would result from the denial of a constitutional
right. On the other hand, forbidding, at trial, any results of
questioning would present serious practical problems for the
police and might deter them in investigating crime. The Mas-
siah08 case which prevents the use in federal trials of incrimi-
nating statements made by a defendant after indictment with-
out counsel, in response to the foregoing argument, noted that
the rule of the case was to prevent the use of such evidence at
trial, thus allowing the police to continue its further investiga-
tion: "We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it
104. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
105. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963) ; Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Sttudy in
Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 557 (1963).
106. LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL CmMINAL PROCEDUBE
135 (1964).
107. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1052 (1964) and material there cited.
108. Massiab v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected
criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates,
even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that
we hold is that the defendant's own statements, obtained by fed-
eral agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not
constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against
him at the trial."'0 In Massiah, the police claimed the defendant
was a minor part of a narcotics peddling gang, and that further
questioning was conducted to attempt to locate the leaders of
the gang; the Court did not seem to disapprove such activities.
It is not clear, however, whether this further investigation per-
mitted by the Court encompasses questioning of the defendant
directly, or only continuing independent investigation. Since it
seems evident, however, that the police may make a continuing
independent investigation, it is submitted that the former mean-
ing-questioning the defendant directly-is what is intended to
be allowed. In this light, the Court might be receptive to argu-
ments by the police to limit its expansion of Escobedo short of
the poisonous tree doctrine. It is submitted that the determina-
tion whether the poisonous tree doctrine is to apply to the right
to counsel area will not be made until after the initial right
has been clarified.
Retroactivity
The possible retroactivity of Escobedo presents another prob-
lem. Gideon has been applied retroactively; Mapp v. Ohio,1 0
applying the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures to the states, has not. This distinction, as
enunciated in Linkletter v. Walker,"' seems to be that Gideon
established a right, in the absence of which a trial might have
been unfair because the defendant was unable to present a prop-
er defense - innocent men may have been convicted because of
lack of counsel. In Mapp, however, there was established an ex-
clusionary rule holding inadmissible evidence improperly se-
cured. Use of evidence violated a right, but did not result in the
possibility of an unfair trial; that is, it did not cause the con-
viction of an innocent person. Escobedo is between these cases,
but it seems closer to Mapp in that the rule it might establish
would exclude certain evidence. Trials conducted under the
109. Id. at 207.
110. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
111. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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old voluntary-confession doctrine would not be tainted by
being unfair as to determination of guilt or innocence. Thus, it
seems reasonable to expect Escobedo's extension, if it comes, not
to be applied retroactively. This interpretation is reinforced by
the latest Supreme Court statement on retroactivity, Tehan v.
United States ex rel. Shot,"12 which relied on Linkletter and held
that the rule applying the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination to the states was not retroactive.
Questioning After the Right Vests
Massiah v. United States 13 seems to preclude the possibility
of contending that once counsel is appointed for an accused and
counsel has consulted with his client, the right to counsel is ful-
filled and the accused could then be properly questioned even
though counsel is not present. Massiah was a federal case which
excluded incriminating statements made after indictment when
counsel was not present. Here, counsel had been procured and
had been consulted earlier, and the admissions were excluded.
So too in Escobedo, counsel had been procured and consulted,
and the admissions were not allowed in evidence at trial.
Some Interpretations
The foregoing discussion has considered the possibilities of
extension of Escobedo. It is not denied that the possible effects
are far-reaching and could require a major adjustment in the
methods of criminal law enforcement in the states. It should also
be admitted that the extension has a constitutional rationale,
and that the degree of extension will depend on policy considera-
tions, upon the outcome of a balancing process between indi-
vidual rights and society's need for orderly and effective enforce-
ment of its laws.
Currently, the public is aware of the inadvisability of ham-
stringing the police. The police claim the Court's decisions have
already limited their effectiveness and that further extension
would be disastrous. These claims are in the context of increas-
ing public awareness of the extent of crime and a rising crime
rate. Presidents and presidential candidates have vowed to cut
112. 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4095 (U.S. Jan., 1966).
113. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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crime in this country. The police claim it is virtually necessary
to question suspects freely in order to uncover crime and find
the guilty. However, the Court does not seem to be very recep-
tive to the arguments of impracticability in the enforcement of
what it considers important and fundamental rights. Other
countries with restrictive codes regulating police questioning
seem to function satisfactorily - India, Scotland, and Great
Britain. 114 Further, the McNabb-Mallory rule imposed on fed-
eral agents has not greatly impeded their effectiveness. 115 Thus,
it seems that the states may expect extension of an accused's
right to counsel in some manner into the investigatory-accusa-
tory area. An indirect result of this might be the creation of a
more efficient police - one that would investigate independently
instead of relying on confessions.
State Interpretation of Escobedo
California has extended the holding of Escobedo to a situa-
tion in which the accused did not request counsel. The court
stated: "The Constitutional right does not arise from the request
of counsel but from the advent of the accusatory stage itself.""8i
Oregon is in accord, 117 so is Rhode Island." 8 Most states, how-
ever, have construed Escobedo on its facts and have not applied
it to cases in which the accused did not requset counsel." 9 A re-
cent Louisiana Supreme Court decision indicates little enthusiasm
for extending Escobedo. In State v. Carter,1 20 the court limited
Escobedo to its unusual fact situation and indicated it would
wait until the United States Supreme Court clarified the area
before changing its position. The court then disposed of the case
on the traditional ground that a confession was not voluntarily
made.
114. See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1045 (1964); Home Office Circular
No. 31/1964, The Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions to the Police,
1964 CRiM. L. REV. 165, 169.
115. Ibid.
116. People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1965).
117. People v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557 (Ore. 1965).
118. State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965) ; State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82
(R.I. 1965).
119. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 176 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 1965); Bean v. State,
398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965) ; People v. Agar, 44 Misc. 2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761
(1965) ; Johnson v. New Jersey, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1905), cert. granted,
34 U.S.L. WEEK 3193 (1965) ; Brown v. State, 131 N.W.2d 169 (Wis. 1965).




Again, the Fifth Circuit seems to be leading the expansion.
In Clifton v. United States,121 a case involving a federal crime
where the defendant did request to see his attorney, the court
stated this doctrine: "Escobedo and Massiah represent a broad
endorsement by the Supreme Court of the right to have counsel
present during an interrogation once the investigation has begun
to focus on a particular suspect." Here, the defendant had coun-
sel, but the interviewing federal agents seemed unaware of that
fact. Although the defendant asked to see his attorney, that
request was made to a local police official and not to the federal
agents who questioned him. The court indicated the investiga-
tors had the burden of inquiring whether the accused had an
attorney.1 22 This is not far removed from saying that once the
inquiry discloses that no counsel has been retained, there is also
a burden to advise of the right to counsel.
The Escobedo Court said that the right to counsel would be a
hollow thing if a conviction is already assured by a pre-trial
examination. It added: "We have learned the lesson of history,
ancient and modern, that a system which comes to depend on
the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evi-
dence independently secured through skillful investigation."' 1 23
This language is complementary to the traditional notion of
arrest as the last stage in a criminal investigation, where one
arrested was brought immediately before a magistrate to deter-
mine if there was sufficient evidence to detain him. Detention
was primarily to prevent escape. More recently, the concept of
arrest is that of an investigatory tool used to provide detention
with the aim of securing information or a confession. The court's
actions may be calling for a return to the earlier notion.
The English judge's rule 124 provides rigorous standards for
informing suspected persons when an investigation becomes
accusatory. When a police officer has reasonable grounds to
prefer charges against a person being questioned, he must in-
form that person that he may be prosecuted for the offense, and
that any statement he might make may be used as evidence.
121. 341 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1965). See Miller v. Warden, 338 F.2d 201 (4th
Cir. 1965) ; Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1965) for cases in accord.
122. 341 F.2d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1965).
123. 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
124. Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, The Judges' Rules and Administrative
Directions to the Police, 1964 CaIM. L. Rav. 165, 169.
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Then, the rules continue with an additional provision: "It is
only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offense
should be put to the accused person after he has been charged
or informed that he may be prosecuted."' 1 The exceptions con-
cern questioning to prevent loss to someone or to the public or
for clearing up an ambiguity in a previous answer or statement.
Such a procedure might also be the outgrowth of the Escobedo
case, with questioning after the accusatory stage being permitted
only when counsel is present, or under some safeguards to pro-
tect a suspect's rights.
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
It has long been held that an accused may waive his right to
appointed counsel. The Supreme Court characterizes a waiver
as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege, adding that the courts indulge every reason-
able presumption against waiver of fundamental rights.126 The
required waiver has been described as being intelligent, free,
voluntary, and competent; it is required that one have full
knowledge of his rights before he can waive them. It is the duty
of the court to inform a defendant of the charges against him,
possible pleas and punishments, and to do this in such a way
that the defendant understands this information. Such varying
facts and circumstances as age, education, mental capacity, back-
ground, and conduct are considered in deciding if waiver was
intelligent. A mere guilty plea is not an intelligent waiver. 127
A printed statement on a confession form waiving the right is
not necessarily sufficient if it is shown that the accused was
not fully informed of the right.12 In essence, it must appear that
the defendant knew of the right through some information given
by authorities, clearly understood that right, and then waived it
without coercion. The Fifth Circuit has held that even an intel-
ligent waiver of the right to counsel at trial does not cure the
deprivation of this right earlier at arraignment.1'
The courts are not lenient in considering waivers. The stand-
ards for proper waiver should be made known to those applying
125. Ibid.
126. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) ; Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
127..Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 .(1945).




the criminal law so that they can correctly inform defendants
of their rights, and so that waivers when made will be proper.
Such a procedure would clear the dockets of many habeas corpus
petitions in this area. It appears that an indigent defendant
informed of his right to appointed counsel will seldom waive
that right, and it would be unwise to depend on waivers as a
means of lessening the impact of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions in this area. It is also imperative that the minutes of a
court accurately reflect how a defendant was advised of his
rights, so that waivers that are made will be upheld in the ap-
pellate courts, and there will be proof of the fact that the de-
fendant was so advised, since appellate courts often decide
waiver questions on the basis of the record and engage in pre-
sumptions against waivers. It also appears that the require-
ments for intelligent waiver will not lessen, but will become
stricter in view of the recent trend in criminal rights cases.
SOME OBSERVATIONS
As this paper demonstrates, the area of right to counsel is
fraught with uncertainty and confusion. The Supreme Court is
enunciating constitutional rules on a case by case basis, over-
turning long accepted law and practice. Behind these develop-
ments can be seen great dissatisfaction with the methods of law
enforcement. In this context, the Court's expansionist mood is
understandable. However, there is little solid ground in the area;
there are few rules and many questions. The process does not
lend itself to quick and speedy answering of these questions.
Congressional and state legislation is needed to fill the gaps.
The administrators of the criminal law need certainty, need
rules they can follow without question. These rules should come
from a comprehensive legislative enactment in the area, con-
sistent with the Supreme Court ground rules already established.
What is needed is collaboration among policemen, lawyers,
judges, criminologists, and penologists to fashion a comprehen-
sive mechanism for enforcement of criminal law that will take
advantage of current knowledge in the area and conform to
the newly-established constitutional rights.
SOME GUIDELINES
1. Presently, counsel must be appointed to indigent defend-
ants in felony prosecutions. However, prudent authorities should
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appoint counsel in serious misdemeanor cases to ensure that such
convictions will not be overruled by cases expanding the right
and, more important, to ensure full implementation of this fun-
damental human right.
2. Counsel must be appointed before the defendant pleads.
The better practice, especially in the more serious cases, would
be to appoint soon after arrest.
3. It is not required by the Supreme Court that counsel be
appointed immediately after arrest, but the bench and bar should
realize that this may be required in the event Escobedo is ex-
tended.
4. Full implementation of the right requires thorough and
complete explanation to a defendant of the right and its scope;
perfunctory reference to the right is not sufficient.
Lee Hargrave
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES OF
APPPOINTED COUNSEL
The decision in the Gideon case, in 1963 has emphasized sev-
eral problems in the administration of criminal justice. Among
them are the following: when to appoint counsel, how to select
counsel, how to finance alternatives to the appointed counsel
system, whether to provide compensation for appointed counsel,
and whether to reimburse appointed counsel for expenses. This
Comment will attempt an exploration of the last of these ques-
'tions, with emphasis on the practical need for reimbursement,
the difficulties involved in securing reimbursement, and the
practice in Louisiana as compared to the federal system and the
other states.
THE PROBLEM
Gideon v. Wainwright established that an indigent accused
of a felony has an absolute right to the assistance of counsel
for his defense. Enforcement of the decision has made necessary
a great increase in the number of attorneys representing in-
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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